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Digest: People v. Lessie
Alexandra A. Harman
Opinion by Werdegar, J., with George, C.J., Kennard,
Baxter, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Issue
What test should courts apply when determining whether a
minor defendant has “knowingly and voluntarily” waived his or
her Miranda rights?
Facts
Tony Lessie, a sixteen-year-old boy, was charged with second
degree murder and convicted at trial.1 Lessie had been involved
in a gang-related shooting in Oceanside, wherein Rusty Seau was
shot and killed.2 Months after the incident, Lessie was taken
into custody, where he twice confessed to shooting Seau—once at
the Oceanside Police Department, and a second time while being
questioned in juvenile hall.3 Lessie claimed the judgment should
be reversed because he never waived his Fifth Amendment
rights, and therefore the trial court erred by admitting his
confessions into evidence.4
At the time, Lessie had finished the tenth grade and worked
in retail.5 Lessie also had experience with the criminal justice
system as a result of two prior arrests, one for burglary and the
other for evading police after being stopped in his car with
marijuana.6 Following the arrest relating to the shooting,
Detective Kelly Deveney told Lessie that he would be able to call
as many people as he wished when they arrived at the police
department.7 Deveney also asked Lessie if he would like to
contact anyone in particular, and Lessie responded in the
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People v. Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th 1152, 1157 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id. at 1158.
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affirmative identifying that person as his father, although Lessie
did not have his father’s phone number at the time.8
Upon arrival at the Oceanside Police Department, Deveney
informed Lessie that she had retrieved his father’s phone
number, and she asked whether Lessie preferred to call or to
have the department call on his behalf.9 Lessie stated that he
would like to make the phone call himself.10
After this
statement, Deveney, with Detective Gordon Govier in the room,
requested that Lessie fill out paperwork and thereafter informed
Lessie of his Miranda rights.11 When Deveney asked Lessie if he
understood what she said, he said “yeah.”12 Next, Deveney began
questioning Lessie about his background and the background of
the gang members who were present the day of the shooting,
without offering Lessie access to a phone.13
Subsequently, Deveney told Lessie that various people,
including family members, had identified him as the killer.14
Lessie initially denied his role in the shooting, but then he
confessed, stating, “I was there, I was, I was there and I was the
shooter.”15 Lessie claimed that the gang members, specifically
James Turner, forced him to shoot Seau as a type of initiation,
and Lessie thought he would receive serious bodily injury if he
did not comply with the instructions.16 Lessie confessed that
upon Turner’s command he shot Seau in the back while Seau was
retreating.17 After his confession, Deveney asked if Lessie would
like a moment, and Lessie responded that he wanted to call his
father.18 Deveney then stepped out of the room to confer with
Govier, and Lessie again asked to call his father.19 Deveney told
Lessie that a phone was being charged in order for him to make a
phone call, but before she allowed him to call she continued to
ask questions about the other gang members.20 Once the phone
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (stating that any individual
held in custody must be informed of the privilege against “self-incriminatory statements”
by being told that he has “the right to remain silent . . . the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires”).
12 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1158–59.
13 Id. at 1159. Lessie stated that he was not a part of the gang, but he wanted to
become a member. Id. at 1157.
14 Id. at 1159.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1157.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1159.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1160.
8
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was brought inside, Lessie called his father and left a message
stating that he was in custody and instructed his father to call
him as soon as possible.21
Four months passed before Deveney and Govier conducted a
second interview, while Lessie was in juvenile hall.22 Again,
detectives informed Lessie of his Miranda rights.23 Lessie
answered their questions, reiterated his involvement in the
shooting, and filled in factual gaps.24
At trial, Lessie argued that People v. Burton25 required the
court to exclude his confession from trial because he maintained
his privilege against self-incrimination during the initial
interrogation by requesting to call his father.26 Lessie further
argued that the second interrogation at juvenile hall was
improper because he never waived his Miranda rights, and thus
Edwards v. Arizona27 prohibited detectives from initiating
further questioning.28 Lastly, Lessie motioned for exclusion
based on a violation of Welfare & Institutions Code section 627(b)
by law enforcement in failing to allow him a phone call within
one hour after confinement.29 The trial court rejected all of these
arguments and allowed Lessie’s confession into evidence at
trial.30 The trial court observed that Burton was no longer
controlling in light of the 1982 Truth-in-Evidence provision in the
California Constitution, which precludes a court from excluding
“relevant evidence . . . whether heard in juvenile or adult
court.”31 The trial court instead applied Fare v. Michael C.32 and
People v. Hector33 and denied that Lessie intended to invoke his

Id.
Id.
Id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
Lessie, Cal. 4th at 1160.
People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 (1971). See infra, note 41 and accompanying text.
Lessie, Cal. 4th at 1162. In Burton, the court formulated a distinct test for cases
involving minor defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege by holding that
a minor maintains this privilege upon a request to see a parent either before or during
interrogation. Id. at 1163 (quoting Burton, 6 Cal. 3d at 383–84).
27 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See infra, note 28.
28 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1160 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85). The court in
Edwards stated that “an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–
85. Thus, Lessie contends that he should not have been subjected to further questioning
after the initial meeting with detectives where he requested to call his father.
29 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1161.
30 Id. at 1160–61.
31 Id. at 1160 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2)).
32 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). See infra, note 47 and accompanying
text.
33 People v. Hector, 83 Cal. App. 4th 228 (2000).
21
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Fifth Amendment right by requesting to speak with his father
because Lessie never explicitly stated such a purpose.34 In
finding that Lessie waived his Fifth Amendment rights, Edwards
could not apply.35 The court also held that the violation of the
Welfare and Institutions Code did not justify the remedy of
evidence exclusion.36
On appeal, the trial court’s conviction was affirmed.37 Lessie
petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court granted it.38
Analysis
The court cited Miranda to reiterate the foundation for
protecting the Fifth Amendment by allowing individuals in
custody the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.39
Next, the court looked to the appropriate application of Miranda
to cases involving minor defendants. The court considered the
rationales of Burton and Fare to determine whether a minor’s
request to speak with a parent was sufficient to invoke the minor
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.40
In Burton, the court reversed a sixteen-year-old male’s
conviction for murder because his confession was wrongly
admitted into evidence after the minor had requested and been
refused the opportunity to speak with his father.41 The court in
Burton stated that a minor defendant may maintain his Fifth
Amendment rights by “[a]ny words or conduct which ‘reasonably
appears inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the
suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with police at
that time . . . .’”42 The Burton court held that a minor defendant
calling upon a parent while in custody was sufficient to invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege.43
The court reasoned that Burton had been limited by the 1982
provision of the state Constitution, entitled Truth-in-Evidence,
which prohibited courts from excluding any evidence relevant to
criminal proceedings dealing with either adults or minors.44

Id.
Id. at 1160–61.
Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 467, 473–74 (1966)).
40 Id. at 1162–68.
41 Id. at 1162 (citing People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 (1971)).
42 Burton, 6 Cal. 3d at 382 (quoting People v. Randall, 1 Cal.3d 948, 956 (1970)).
43 Id. at 383–84.
44 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1163 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2)) (stating that
“[t]he 1982 Truth-in-Evidence provision provides that ‘relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and
34
35
36
37
38
39
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Despite this limitation, the court acknowledged the need to follow
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, which “bind[s] the
state courts under the federal Constitution’s supremacy clause
despite the Truth-in-Evidence provision.”45 The court then
recognized that although Burton had never been “expressly
overruled,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fare proves that
Burton is no longer good law.46
In Fare, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s
decision to exclude a sixteen-year-old’s confession in a case where
the minor defendant’s request to see his probation officer had
been denied prior to the interrogation that elicited his
confession.47 The lower court in Fare had applied the Burton
rationale in stressing that a minor’s relationship with his or her
probation officer is similar to that of a “personal advisor who
would understand his problems and needs and on whose advice
the minor could rely.”48 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
lower court’s decision based on the rationale that an attorney is
situated to provide unique assistance within the criminal justice
system that neither a probation officer nor another adult of close
relation to a minor can provide.49 The high court further
reasoned that when a minor makes no explicit request to speak
with an attorney:
[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial
interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon
an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and
voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel.50

The court used this rationale to address Lessie’s argument
distinguishing the situation in Fare, where a minor defendant
requested to speak with his probation officer, from the situation
in Burton, where the minor requested to speak with a parent.51
The court stated that the rationale in Fare cannot be read so
narrowly as to not extend to the situation presented by Burton.52
The court further identified the other factors to be considered
under the totality of the circumstances approach, including an

hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in
juvenile or adult court.’” (internal citations omitted)).
45 Lessie, 47 Cal. 4th at 1164 (internal citations omitted).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1165 (quoting In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 476 (1978)).
49 Id. at 1165 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722 (1979)).
50 Id. at 1165–66 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 724–25).
51 Id. at 1165.
52 Id.
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“evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his
Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those
rights.”53
Lastly, the court reiterated the difficulties courts have
encountered in attempting to reconcile Burton and Fare.54 The
court also acknowledged the need for courts to proceed cautiously
in determining whether a minor acts knowingly and
voluntarily.55 Ultimately, the court reasoned that, in light of the
California Constitution’s Truth-in-Evidence provision and the
federal law according to both Miranda and Fare, the totality of
the circumstances test is appropriate.56
Based on the totality of the circumstances test, the court
considered both Lessie’s request to see his father as well as his
background, education, and age.57
Accordingly, the court
reasoned that Lessie did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights
because he explicitly stated that he understood his Miranda
rights as read to him, he had prior experience with the criminal
justice system that did not indicate otherwise, and he never
indicated any explicit intention to seek counsel or to remain
silent.58
Holding
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The court
held that the appropriate test to apply to determine whether a
minor defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth
Amendment right is the totality of the circumstances test from
Fare.59 While the court did not give weight to a violation of a
defendant’s right to make a telephone call within one hour of
confinement, the court considered the purpose of a defendant’s
statement that might indicate a desire to maintain his Fifth
Amendment rights in addition to the relevant circumstances.60
In this case, the court decided that Lessie made no such
indication by merely requesting to speak with his father in light
of the fact that Lessie had prior experience with the criminal
justice system.61 Thus, based on the relevant circumstances, the
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 1167 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
Id. at 1167–68.
Id. at 1166–67.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1169–70.
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court found that Lessie knowingly and voluntarily waived his
Fifth Amendment right because: (1) he was informed of his
Miranda rights and confirmed that he understood them; (2) he
possessed a background consistent with such an understanding
due to his prior arrests and education level; (3) he gave no
explicit indication that he desired to invoke his Fifth Amendment
right; and (4) he agreed to answer interrogation questions.62
Legal Significance
The court’s decision limits the manner in which courts may
interpret a minor defendant’s invocation of his or her Fifth
Amendment rights during interrogation by overruling the Burton
decision. A minor’s request to speak with a parent will no longer
suffice as an automatic invocation of the privilege. Instead,
under the totality of the circumstances test, courts are granted
the flexibility to consider the relevant circumstances surrounding
an interrogation in addition to statements made by a minor
defendant. In this case, the court rejected the rule in Burton and
adopted the totality of the circumstances approach from Fare.

62

Id.

